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Abstract 
 
This thesis attempts to analyze coordination mechanisms between producers and 
suppliers in a supply chain. Since the entities in a supply chain work usually 
independently each from the other, it is of crucial importance to develop coordination 
mechanisms so that they can set their objectives together and coordinate their 
activities to optimize the global system performance. 
In the first part, some recent optimization models of coordination will be studied and 
discussed, like capacitated planning models for producers, lot-sizing models for 
suppliers and the ideal model with cooperation and sharing information from both 
parties. 
The second part will consist in extending some of these coordination models to include 
some additional furthers. For example, some models will be extended to the case 
where more competing suppliers and producers are involved.  
Then, a numerical investigation will also be undertaken to compare the different types 
of anticipation of the producer and their effects, compared to an ideal situation which 
performs a complete integration of the supplier into the producers model, a situation 
that is really difficult to apply in the real world.  
Moreover, the same investigation through the extended models would be undertaken to 
test and validate these new models. There will be a comparison between three types of 
models, concerning the effect of incrementing the number of suppliers, the number of 
producers and the number of both of them.  
Finally, it will be deduced that the best model for the producer would be having a 
reactive anticipation of the supplier’s model, that is create a closer coordination which 
will benefit not only the producer but also the supplier. Although it is difficult to 
implement compared with the other two models and the information about the supplier 
is difficult to find, it would have a really good improvement on the final cost nearly as 
good as the ideal model.  
Related to the multiple parties, it has been concluded that in general terms the best 
model is the one with an individual producer and supplier. But looking more in detail 
there are some improvements in the total cost when the producer is divided by smaller 
producers, having less productivity each one. In that case, and depending on the 
features of the supplier, it may be some improvements on the total cost of the supply 
chain.        
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1- Symbols 
 
Indices and index sets: 
t ∈  1, … , T Period 
i ∈  1, … , I  Component  
j ∈  1, … , J  Job 
l ∈  1, … , L  Order 
Jl  index set of jobs customer order l  
Pj  set of immediate predecessor jobs of job j 
p ∈  1. . P  Producers 
s ∈  1. . S  Suppliers 
 
 
Variables: 
𝑌𝑡    Capacity manpower in period t 
𝑌𝑡
+  Increase in capacity in period t 
𝑌𝑡
−  Decrease in capacity in period t 
𝑌𝑡𝑝    Capacity manpower in period t for the producer p 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
+  Increase in capacity in period t for the producer p 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
−  Decrease in capacity in period t for the producer p 
𝑥𝑗𝑡    Assembly indicator (𝑥𝑗𝑡 =1 if job j is started at time t) 
𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝    Assembly indicator (𝑥𝑗𝑡 =1 if job j is started at time t in producer p) 
𝑞𝑖𝑡   Order quantity of component I at time t 
𝑦𝑡    Overtime in period t 
𝑦𝑡𝑝    Overtime in period t for the producer p 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑃  Inventory of component i in period t (producer) 
𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃  Inventory of component i in period t for producer p 
∆𝑗   Number of periods job j surpasses its due date 
∆𝑗𝑝   Number of periods job j surpasses its due date in producer p 
𝛿𝑖𝑡   Anticipated quantity of component i to be delivered in t 
𝑑𝑖𝑡   Quantity of component i delivered in t 
𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠   Order quantity of component i in period t delivered by supplier s 
𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠   Order quantity of component i in period t ordered by the producer p to 
the supplier s. 
  Coordination Mechanisms in Supply Chain 
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𝑑𝑖𝑡
+  Number of units component i which are ordered but not delivered on 
time t 
𝑑𝑖𝑡
−  Number of units component i which are delivered but not ordered on 
time t 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆   Inventory of component i in period t (supplier) 
𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆   Inventory of component i in period t of supplier s 
𝑧𝑖𝑡   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured in period t) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑠   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured in period t by 
supplier s) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured in period t for 
producer p) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured by the supplier s in 
period t for producer p) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡   Production amount of product i in period t 
𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑠   Production amount of product i in period t by supplier s 
𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠   Production amount of product i by supplier k in period t for the producer 
p 
∆𝐶𝑡  Increase in capacity in period t 
∆𝐶𝑡𝑠   Increase in capacity in period t for supplier s 
 
 
 
Constants: 
c  Cost per capacity unit 
𝑐+  Cost to increase the capacity by one unit 
𝑐−  Cost to decrease the capacity by one unit 
𝑝𝑖   Purchase price of component i 
𝑐  Overtime cost 
ℎ𝑖
𝑃  Holding cost of component i for the producer 
F  Penalty cost for exceeding the due date 
𝑌1
′   Initial capacity 
𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity 
𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal decrease in capacity 
𝑌𝑝
+𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity for the producer p 
𝑌𝑝
−𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal decrease in capacity for the producer p 
𝑎𝑗𝑠   Capacity consumption of job j in supplier s after its start 
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𝐷𝑗   Duration of the job 
𝐷𝑗𝑝   Duration of the job for the producer p 
𝐸𝑙   Due date of customer order l 
𝐸𝑙𝑝   Due date of customer order l for the producer p 
𝑣𝑖𝑗   Quantity of component i required to start job j 
𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑝   Quantity of component i required to start job j for the producer p 
𝑝𝑖   Purchase price of component i 
ℎ𝑖
𝑆  Holding cost of component i for the supplier 
𝑠𝑖   Setup cost of component i 
τ  Cost to increase the capacity by one unit 
K  Penalty cost due to delayed delivery 
𝜖  Penalty cost due to premature delivery 
𝐼1
′   Initial inventory 
𝑞𝑖𝑡   Order quantity of component i in period t 
𝑐𝑖   Manufacturing coefficient of component i 
C  Normal capacity 
𝐶𝑠  Normal capacity for the supplier s 
𝛼𝑡   % capacity available in period t 
𝛼𝑡𝑠   % capacity available in period t for the supplier s 
∆𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity 
∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity for the supplier s 
M  Number representing infinite 
 
 
  
  Coordination Mechanisms in Supply Chain 
   
9 
 
2- Preface 
 
 
2.1- Origin of the project 
 
 
This thesis has its origin in the author's interest to increase the theoretical basis of 
supply chain management (SCM) acquired in the subjects of the university. The main 
objective was to have the maximum knowledge on the implementation of SCM in order 
to demonstrate an added value to logistic companies in the end of the career. The 
study of the Coordination Mechanisms in Supply Chain is the first step to start working 
deeper in this field and to have an overview of the optimization models in supply chain. 
 
 
2.2- Motivation 
 
Supply chain management has recently undergone a fast development in theory and 
practice. Due to globalization and competence, most of the companies have split their 
logistic into various independent units. These units usually are decision making 
factories within a network of material and information flows. Nowadays, many logistic-
based approaches to supply chain management are still within the traditional realm of 
one central decision maker unit. But few approaches have been made on operational 
supply chain in more than one independent decision maker.  
The idea to create a coordination mechanism based on the operational supply chain 
that can introduce multiple suppliers and multiple producers has become a great 
motivation to start a further study of new mathematical models that fit into real 
companies.   
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3- Introduction 
 
3.1- Objectives 
 
The main objectives of this project are to analyze coordination mechanisms between 
producers and suppliers in a supply chain. The thesis will start with a study of recent 
optimization models of coordination mechanisms in operational supply chain, more 
precisely, there will be an investigation of the coordination mechanisms increasing the 
complexity between the suppliers and the producers both possessing some private 
information. In particular, there will be undertaken an analysis of the effect of a possible 
disclosure of private information on the overall performance of the supply chain. 
Afterwards, an extension and improvement of these models will be undertaken to 
include some additional furthers just to increase the members involved to an arbitrary 
number, i.e., multiple suppliers and multiple producers.  
 
 
 
3.2- Scope 
This thesis is organized as follows. After a brief review of related literature and 
theoretical background on section 4, there will be a study of some specific models of 
decision in section 5, developing the producer’s model with some kinds of anticipations 
and the supplier’s model. Then, it will be a linkage between them in the ideal model 
that coordinates both models. In the next section 6, an extension of the ideal model will 
be undertaken, creating some other models including one producer with multiple 
suppliers, multiple producers with one supplier and the generic model with multiple 
producers and multiple suppliers. Finally, in the last section, these models are exposed 
in an extensive numerical investigation with AMPL, to test and validate the anticipations 
from the producers and to know the influence of incrementing some parties of the 
extended models.  
  
  Coordination Mechanisms in Supply Chain 
   
11 
 
4- Theoretical background 
4.1- Supply chain management 
 
A supply chain is a network of organizations, people, technology, activities, information 
and resources that are involved, through upstream and downstream linkages, in the 
different processes that produce value in the form of products and services in the 
hands of the ultimate consumer.1 
In theory, supply chain seeks to match supply with demand and do so with the minimal 
inventory. To achieve this objective, coordination with channel partners is needed, 
which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers, and customers. 
Another issue of interest of SCM is to fulfill customer demands through the most 
efficient use of resources, including distribution capacity, inventory and labor. Various 
aspects of optimizing the supply chain include liaising with suppliers to eliminate 
bottlenecks; sourcing strategically to strike a balance between lowest material cost and 
transportation and traditional logistics optimization to maximize the efficiency of the 
distribution side. 
 
 
4.2- Coordination mechanisms in supply chain 
 
A supply chain is a set of organizations that are involved in transforming raw materials 
to a final product. Usually, these organizations are separate and independent economic 
parties. Although it is known that a fully integrated solution should result in optimal 
system performance, it is not always the best interest of each entity in the system. Due 
to this effect, most of independent supply chain members usually prefer to optimize 
their individual objectives rather than the entire system ones. It is of crucial importance 
in supply chain management to develop mechanisms that can align the objectives of 
independent supply chain members and coordinate their decisions and activities so as 
to optimize system performance. Also coordination mechanisms have to identify an 
improvement compared to an initial uncoordinated solution and to include incentives to 
implement the improved solution. 
                                                          
1
 Christopher (2005, p.17) 
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There are some definitions on the literature for coordination mechanisms in the field of 
mechanism design, where a mechanism constitutes a framework that specifies the 
outcomes of decentralized parties depending on the actions undertaken by them: 
 
A coordination mechanism is a mechanism for which the implementation of the optimal 
strategies by decentralized, self-interested parties may lead to a coordinated outcome and 
neither violates the individual rationality of the participating parties nor the budget balance of 
the system.
2
 
 
Therefore, we have a coordination mechanism that have to assure that individual 
rationality requires that no party is worse off by participating in the mechanism, i.e., that 
the profits of all participating parties are at least equal to their profits achieved in the 
default solution. Budget balance means that the payments of parties in the mechanism 
sum up to zero, i.e., that the mechanism does not require an outside subsidy. 3 
 
4.3- Hierarchical planning in supply chain 
 
This thesis is based on hierarchical planning. This concept is focused on a supply link 
within a supply network consisting of a producer and a supplier. As showed in Figure 1, 
to meet external customer demand, the producer places orders for some necessary 
components with a supplier, which, contingent on the supplier’s capacity situation is 
more or less correctly carried out. More precisely, the delivery of components might not 
match the ordered amount and might not be in time. However, for a longer horizon of 
10 weeks, the total amount is fixed according to a general procurement contract and is 
delivered correctly. 
 
Figure 1. Supply link investigated 
Hence, a relationship between producer and supplier is considered, with the producer 
being in the upper level and the supplier representing the lower level. Taking the 
position of the producer, we particularly assume that she is not fully informed of the 
supplier’s decision situation, especially of the operational capacity conditions. To 
coordinate the link, we establish as a typical control measure a penalty cost for not 
delivering the correct amount in due time. That is, for given total external demand, we 
                                                          
2
 Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 857) 
3
 Martin Albrecth (2010, p. 22) 
Supplier Producer
Consumer 
market
Purchase order 
Delivery 
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are considering an operational short-term coordination of ordering and adjoin delivery 
decisions over a total horizon of T periods (see figure 2). Consequently, an order q 
represents a sequence of component orders, and the subsequent delivery d, tries to 
match such an order, possibly deviating from q by an amount of δ.  
 
Figure 2. Producer- Supplier hierarchy 
 
To put in more general terms, the top-down influence consists of a task-oriented 
instruction (q) and a control-oriented instruction (K). This latter instruction could be 
interpreted as a leadership activity and is exclusively employed to guarantee the 
correct execution. 
Taking a closer look at the state of information, we reasonably assume that both 
parties maintain some privacy, i.e., they do not reveal all their data, which consequently 
results in an asymmetric information state. This situation, however, does not give rise 
to an opportunistic behavior; one would not capture essential features of a supply chain 
which is usually intended to establish a long-term trusting cooperation. Hence, we 
presume a team like behavior, i.e., all parties attempt to optimize a common goal. Still 
there exists private information, and it is one of our main concerns to quantify the effect 
of private information on the overall performance of the supply link. 
Usually, a supply link has to be embedded into the entire supply network. As an 
example, the supplier might not have just one but several other producers he is in 
contact with. In capturing this influence of the full network, we describe the availability 
of the supplier’s capacity as being stochastic. More, precisely, at the time when the 
producer places her purchasing order q with the supplier, the capacity is only 
stochastically known for both parties. Only later, when the delivery decision is to be 
made, the supplier is assumed to know all his commitments, and hence the capacity 
Producer
Supplier
Order 
quantity q 
Delivery 
quantity d 
Penalty cost 
parameter K 
Deterministic external 
demand of finished products 
Stochastic external demand 
of components 
Customer
External 
producers
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that is still available. This externally induced uncertainty adds to the lack of knowledge 
she already has with the unknown characteristics of the supplier.4 
Finally, it is assumed that the basic idea of hierarchical planning is the separation of 
decisions according to their impact, e.g., on the profitability of the supply chain. The 
decisions at the upper levels, i.e., those with greater impact, are determined first and 
implemented as targets for the planning of the lower levels. Further important 
characteristics are the aggregation of data and decisions at the upper levels and the 
provision of feedback by the lower levels. 
The main objective of hierarchical planning should be to regard team behavior: it not 
only assumes truthful information exchange, but also the willingness of parties to 
accept solutions inferior to the initial solution, provided that a system wide improvement 
is obtained. 
  
                                                          
4
 Hierarchical coordination mechanisms within the supply chain. C. Schneeweiss, K. Zimmer. 
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5-  Preliminary models 
This thesis is the improvement of a report from the European Journal of Operational 
Research in 2002 titled “Hierarchical coordination mechanisms within the supply 
chain”. The paper analyses operational coordination mechanisms between a producer 
and a supplier within a supply chain having private local information. Based on these 
first models, we will extend them to find a model that can be applicable to all the 
possible supply chains whatever their sizes are, introducing multiple producers and 
multiple suppliers. 
In the next section there is a description of the models used to create the coordination 
mechanisms in the supply chain. First of all, there is a presentation of the producer’s 
and the supplier’s mathematical models independently, and linking both models it can 
be represented the ideal mathematical model, which will benefit both parts as a team 
but only as a benchmark. 
 
5.1- Producer’s model 
 
The producer’s model consists on a capacitated project planning model, with due date 
penalty cost. More precisely, the company produces several products which are 
ordered by some external customers, and the components needed have to be 
delivered by the supplier. 
For the producer, it is assumed that a set of orders are known on a period T. Each 
order contains a sequence of manufacturing jobs which, for each order l are assigned 
the same due date. In order to fulfill every customer, the producer has to place some 
orders to the supplier, who will procure her with the necessary components. 
For the producer’s model we will differentiate three types of anticipation and 
coordination. On the one extreme, the producer is not taking into account any feature 
of the supply chain (pure top-down hierarchy), whereas on the other extreme the 
supplier is fully integrated into the producer (ideal model) such that an anticipation 
disappears. 
 
5.1.1- Pure top-down hierarchy (P) 
This first model for the producer is an individual model that only takes care of 
optimizing its own benefit without taking into account any variables of the supplier. It 
means that in the pure top-down hierarchy the delivered amount dit is identical to the 
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ordered amount. In this case, there is no anticipation function since there is no possible 
reaction to the producer’s instruction. 
The model would be represented as follows: 
 
Objective function: 
 𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑍𝑃 =   𝑐𝑌𝑡 + 𝑐
+𝑌𝑡
+ + 𝑐−𝑌𝑡
− 𝑇𝑡=1      (P1) 
 
Constraints: 
Capacity adaptation constraints: 
𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡
+ − 𝑌𝑡
−    ∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1   (P2) 
𝑌1 = 𝑌1
′           (P3) 
𝑌𝑡
+ ≤ 𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥     ∀𝑡     (P4) 
𝑌𝑡
− ≤ 𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡     (P5) 
 
Capacity constraints: 
  𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘 ≤ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑡
𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗 =1  ∀𝑡                     (P6) 
 
Network constraints: 
 𝑥𝑗𝑡 = 1
𝑇
𝑡=1      ∀𝑗     (P7) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗  𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑙 + ∆𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=1    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑙, ∀𝑙    (P8) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷ℎ 𝑥ℎ𝑡 ≤  𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑗, ℎ ∈ 𝑃 𝑗    (P9) 
 
Material balance constraints: 
 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐽
𝑗 =1     ∀𝑖, 𝑡   (P10) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 −  𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗 =1    ∀𝑖, 𝑡   (P11) 
𝐼𝑖1 = 0     ∀𝑖   (P12) 
 
Order delivery constraints: 
𝛿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑡       ∀𝑖, 𝑡   (P13) 
 
Integrality and non-negativity constraints: 
𝑌𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡
+, 𝑌𝑡
−, 𝑞𝑖𝑡 , 𝛿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡 , ∆𝑗≥ 0  ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑗   (P14) 
𝑥𝑗𝑡 ∈ {0,1}    ∀𝑗, 𝑡   (P15) 
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Indices and index sets: 
t ∈  1, … , T Period 
i ∈  1, … , I  Component  
j ∈  1, … , J  Job 
l ∈  1, … , L  Order 
Jl  index set of jobs customer order l  
Pj  set of immediate predecessor jobs of job j 
 
Variables: 
𝑌𝑡    Capacity manpower in period t 
𝑌𝑡
+  Increase in capacity in period t 
𝑌𝑡
−  Decrease in capacity in period t 
𝑥𝑗𝑡    Assembly indicator (𝑥𝑗𝑡 =1 if job j is started at time t) 
𝑞𝑖𝑡   Order quantity of component I at time t 
𝑦𝑡    Overtime in period t 
𝐼𝑖𝑡   Inventory of component i in period t (producer) 
∆𝑗   Number of periods job j surpasses its due date 
𝛿𝑖𝑡   Anticipated quantity of component i to be delivered in t 
 
Constants: 
c  Cost per capacity unit 
𝑐+  Cost to increase the capacity by one unit 
𝑐−  Cost to decrease the capacity by one unit 
𝑝𝑖   Purchase price of component i 
𝑐  Overtime cost 
ℎ𝑖
𝑃  Holding cost of component i for the producer 
F  Penalty cost for exceeding the due date 
𝑌1
′   Initial capacity 
𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity 
𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal decrease in capacity 
𝑎𝑗𝑘   Capacity consumption of job j in period k after its start 
𝐷𝑗   Duration of the job 
𝐸𝑙   Due date of customer order l 
𝑣𝑖𝑗   Quantity of component i required to start job j 
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The objective function will only consider capacity costs, as they are cheaper than 
overtime and holding costs, and the purchasing price remains constant so it does not 
affect the optimization. 
Related to the constraints, they can be represented in five categories: capacity 
adaptation, capacity, network, material balance and order delivery. 
The capacity adaptation is described in (P2) with a balance equation, the initial 
capacity amount is fixed in equation (P3) and the maximum values for the increases 
and decreases in the capacity are fixed in (P4) and (P5). Equation (P6), related also to 
the capacity, represents the consumption of every job when it starts until it finishes. In 
the network constraints, (P7) indicate that each job has to start only once. (P8) is 
related to the due date of each order, and (P9) determine the temporal network 
structure related to the predecessors of the jobs. 
In material balance the constraint (P10) makes sure that a job j in time t can only be 
produced if the necessary components were made available for the supplier. Equation 
(P11) defines the material balance equation with initial condition (P12). Equation (P13) 
is the most interesting constraint. As the delivered amount is identical to the ordered 
amount, it can be assured that the supplier model is not taken into account, meaning 
that the model follows a pure top - down hierarchy. Finally, it is assumed the integrality 
and the non-negativity constraints in (P14) and (P15). 
 
 
 
5.1.2- Non-reactive anticipation (NP) 
In contrast to the pure top-down hierarchy, the non-reactive accounts for importance 
features of the supplier’s model. This means that this model would try to guess some of 
the supplier’s capacity constraints, extending the constraints of the last model with two 
new constraints, which would modify the order demand a little bit to adjust more to the 
supplier’ capacity, but it is not anticipating the reaction of the supplier. Hence, the 
delivered amount dit is no longer the ordered amount, so this constraint can be omitted, 
and substituted for a non-reactively anticipated set of relations (NP13 and NP14): 
The next model would be described as follows: 
 
Objective function: 
 𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑍𝑃 =   𝑐𝑌𝑡 + 𝑐
+𝑌𝑡
+ + 𝑐−𝑌𝑡
− 𝑇𝑡=1      (NP1) 
 
Constraints: 
Capacity adaptation constraints: 
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𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡
+ − 𝑌𝑡
−    ∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1   (NP2) 
𝑌1 = 𝑌1
′           (NP3) 
𝑌𝑡
+ ≤ 𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥     ∀𝑡     (NP4) 
𝑌𝑡
− ≤ 𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡     (NP5) 
 
Capacity constraints: 
  𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘 ≤ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑡
𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗 =1  ∀𝑡                     (NP6) 
 
Network constraints: 
 𝑥𝑗𝑡 = 1
𝑇
𝑡=1      ∀𝑗     (NP7) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗  𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑙 + ∆𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=1    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑙, ∀𝑙    (NP8) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷ℎ 𝑥ℎ𝑡 ≤  𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑗, ℎ ∈ 𝑃 𝑗    (NP9) 
 
Material balance constraints: 
 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐽
𝑗 =1     ∀𝑖, 𝑡   (NP10) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 −  𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗 =1    ∀𝑖, 𝑡   (NP11) 
𝐼𝑖1 = 0     ∀𝑖   (NP12) 
 
Order delivery constraints: 
 𝑐𝑖𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 ≤ 𝛼𝑡𝐶 + ∆𝐶𝑡    ∀𝑡   (NP13) 
 𝜏∆𝐶𝑡 ≤ 𝐴𝐿
𝑇
𝑡=1        (NP14) 
 
Integrality and non-negativity constraints: 
𝑌𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡
+, 𝑌𝑡
−, 𝑞𝑖𝑡 , 𝛿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡 , ∆𝑗 , ∆𝐶𝑡 ≥ 0  ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑗   (NP15) 
𝑥𝑗𝑡 ∈ {0,1}    ∀𝑗, 𝑡   (NP16) 
 
New or modified variables: 
∆𝐶𝑡  Increase in capacity in period t 
 
New or modified variables constants: 
C  Normal capacity 
𝛼𝑡   % capacity available in period t 
∆𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity 
τ  Cost to increase the capacity by one unit 
𝐴𝐿  Aspiration level for extra capacity 
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The objective function will only consider again the capacity costs, as they are cheaper 
than other options. 
New constraints (NP13) and (NP14) indicate estimations of the producer for the 
presumed capacity of the supplier. Hence, the supplier is taken into account by his 
presumed capacity and also by his aspiration level AL, which is related to the willing to 
build extra capacity. Then, the supplier is essentially represented by his capacity 
situation which seems not be an unreasonable assumption. Other constraints remain 
the same as in the model of pure top-down hierarchy (5.1.1). 
 
5.1.3- Reactive anticipation (RP) 
This model will try to react to the supplier’s capacity creating an anticipation decision 
model.  On this occasion, the producer will obtain the ordered amount anticipating the 
model for the supplier (see next section 5.2 for the supplier model). That is, the 
producer will introduce his data to an unreal supplier model, replacing the unknown 
parameters by their estimates. Then, the demand would be a task-oriented order 
quantity qit joined with a control-oriented penalty cost K, which reflect the temporary 
situation the supply link is in. There will be only analyzed penalties for delayed 
deliveries but not for premature deliveries, due to the fact that premature deliveries only 
cause additional inventories for the producer, whereas delayed deliveries cause 
extremely unwanted stockouts and need therefore to be optimized. Similarly, 
optimization of purchasing costs is not of our concern. 
 
Objective function: 
 𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑍𝑃 =   𝑐𝑌𝑡 + 𝑐
+𝑌𝑡
+ + 𝑐−𝑌𝑡
− +   𝐾𝛿+𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 +  𝑐 𝑦𝑡 +   ℎ𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 𝐹 max𝑗∈𝐽𝑙 ∆𝑗
𝐿
𝑙=1         (RP1) 
 
Constraints: 
Capacity adaptation constraints: 
𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡
+ − 𝑌𝑡
−     ∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1  (RP2) 
𝑌1 = 𝑌1
′           (RP3) 
𝑌𝑡
+ ≤ 𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡    (RP4) 
𝑌𝑡
− ≤ 𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥       ∀𝑡    (RP5) 
 
Capacity constraints: 
  𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘 ≤ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑡
𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗 =1   ∀𝑡                    (RP6) 
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Network constraints: 
 𝑥𝑗𝑡 = 1
𝑇
𝑡=1       ∀𝑗    (RP7) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗  𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑙 + ∆𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑙, ∀𝑙   (RP8) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷ℎ 𝑥ℎ𝑡 ≤  𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1      ∀𝑗, ℎ ∈ 𝑃 𝑗    (RP9) 
 
Material balance constraints: 
 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐽
𝑗 =1      ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (RP10) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 −  𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗 =1     ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (RP11) 
𝐼𝑖1 = 0      ∀𝑖  (RP12) 
 
Order delivery constraints: 
𝛿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑡        ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (RP13) 
𝑑𝑖 ,𝑡+1 + 𝛿𝑖 ,𝑡+1
+ − 𝛿𝑖 ,𝑡+1
− = 𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡
+ − 𝛿𝑖𝑡
−  ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (RP14) 
𝑑𝑖1 + 𝛿𝑖1
+ − 𝛿𝑖1
− = 𝑞𝑖1    ∀𝑖     (RP15) 
 
Integrality and non-negativity constraints: 
𝑌𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡
+, 𝑌𝑡
−, 𝛿𝑖𝑡 , 𝛿
+
𝑖𝑡 , 𝛿
−
𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡 , ∆𝑗 , ∆𝐶𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑗  (RP16) 
𝑥𝑗𝑡 ∈ {0,1}     ∀𝑗, 𝑡  (RP17) 
 
The objective function minimizes the capacity costs, holding costs and costs charged 
for not serving the customer in time. Specifically, in the first term there are the costs for 
the capacity manpower and the increases or decreases of the capacity depending on 
the period. The second term consists on minimizing the delayed deliveries. The third 
term consists on the costs for overtime in period T. The fourth term represents holding 
costs for components being stocked at the producer, and finally, the last term stands 
for costs the producer is charged for not serving her customers in due time. In this 
model only the delayed deliveries are optimized instead of purchasing costs or 
premature deliveries. 
In order delivery constraints there are introduced three new equations. The first one 
relates the order demand of the producer with the order delivery optimized with the 
supplier model; hence qit is not anymore a variable but a parameter (RP13). There is 
also introduced in this model the delayed and the premature deliveries caused by the 
supplier, in constraints RP14 and RP15. 
To know how the parameter qit is obtained, we will detail below the supplier model. 
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5.2- Supplier’s model (S) 
 
The supplier model is a linear lot-sizing model that considers setup costs but no setup 
times. This model tries to fulfill the producer’s orders in time depending on the available 
capacity in each period.  
 
Objective function: 
 𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝑍𝑆 =    𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 − ℎ𝑖
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆 − 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡 − 𝐾𝛿𝑖𝑡
+ − 𝜖𝛿𝑖𝑡
− −  𝜏∆𝐶𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1  (S1) 
 
Constraints: 
Material balance constraints: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡      ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (S2) 
𝐼𝑖1
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑖
′       ∀𝑖     (S3) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑧𝑖𝑡       ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (S4) 
 
Capacity constraints: 
 𝑐𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛼𝑡𝐶 + ∆𝐶𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1    ∀𝑡     (S5) 
∆𝐶𝑡 ≤ ∆𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡     (S6) 
 
Order delivery constraints: 
𝑑𝑖 ,𝑡+1 + 𝛿𝑖 ,𝑡+1
+ − 𝛿𝑖 ,𝑡+1
− = 𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡
+ − 𝛿𝑖𝑡
−  ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (S7) 
𝑑𝑖1 + 𝛿𝑖1
+ − 𝛿𝑖1
− = 𝑞𝑖1    ∀𝑖     (S8) 
 𝑑 =  𝑞𝑇𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑖     (S9) 
 
Integrality and non-negativity constraints: 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 , 𝑑𝑖𝑡 , 𝛿𝑖𝑡
+, 𝛿𝑖𝑡
−, 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆 , ∆𝐶𝑡 ≥ 0   ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (S10) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 ∈  0,1      ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (S11) 
 
 
Indices and index sets: 
t ∈  1, … , T Period 
i ∈  1, … , I  Component  
 
Variables: 
𝑑𝑖𝑡   Quantity of component i delivered in t 
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𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆   Inventory of component i in period t(supplier) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured in period t) 
𝑑𝑖𝑡
+  Number of units component i which are ordered but not delivered on 
time t 
𝑑𝑖𝑡
−  Number of units component i which are delivered but not ordered on 
time t 
∆𝐶𝑡  Increase in capacity in period t 
𝑄𝑖𝑡   Production amount of product i in period t 
 
Constants: 
𝑝𝑖   Purchase price of component i 
ℎ𝑖
𝑆  Holding cost of component i for the supplier 
𝑠𝑖   Setup cost of component i 
τ  Cost to increase the capacity by one unit 
K  Penalty cost due to delayed delivery 
𝜖  Penalty cost due to premature delivery 
𝐼1
′   Initial inventory 
𝑞𝑖𝑡   Order quantity of component i in period t 
𝑐𝑖   Manufacturing coefficient of component i 
C  Normal capacity 
𝛼𝑡   % capacity available in period t 
∆𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity 
M  Number representing infinite 
 
The objective function represents the contribution margin for the supplier, consisting on 
maximizing the sales and reducing inventory, setup and penalty costs. In the function 
there are costs for the producer’s penalty for not keeping the due date and costs for 
premature delivery. The last term stands for costs caused by a capacity extension. 
In this case there are three groups of constraints: material balance, capacity and order-
delivery constraints. In the material balance constraints the inventory of the supplier is 
described (S2), as well as the initial inventory (S3). (S4) links the production variable Q 
to the setup variable z. The capacity constraints are described in (S5), where the 
production amount of component I will depend on the capacity of the supplier. This 
capacity also depends on a coefficient alpha, indicating the availability of the normal 
capacity in period t. This means that the producer doesn’t know this value, as it 
remains as part of supplier’s private information, and implies that there could be other 
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producer’s that are sharing the supplier’s capacity, so the producers don’t know which 
quantity of orders is available in each period t. Equations (S7) and (S8) represent the 
relationship between order and delivery, and (S9) takes account that total order 
material is ultimately to be delivered. Finally, it is assumed the integrality and the non-
negativity constraints in (P14) and (P15). 
 
 
5.3- Ideal model (ID) 
 
The ideal model, which will be used as a benchmark, consists on the integration of the 
supplier in the producer’s model to consider them as a one decision maker. This 
situation can allow a team without any information asymmetry, so the estimations are 
not necessary and the full capacity and other features of the supplier are known for the 
producer. 
 
 
Figure 3. Scheme of a supply chain with one supplier and one producer 
 
 
Objective function: 
 𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑍𝐼 = 𝑍𝑃 + 𝑍𝑆 =   𝑐𝑌𝑡 + 𝑐
+𝑌𝑡
+ + 𝑐−𝑌𝑡
− 𝑇𝑡=1 +  𝑐 𝑦𝑡 +   ℎ𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 𝐹 max𝑗∈𝐽𝑙 ∆𝑗 +    ℎ𝑖
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡 +  𝜏∆𝐶𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐿
𝑙=1     (ID1) 
 
Constraints: 
Capacity adaptation constraints: 
𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡
+ − 𝑌𝑡
−     ∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1  (ID2) 
𝑌1 = 𝑌1
′           (ID3) 
𝑌𝑡
+ ≤ 𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡    (ID4) 
𝑌𝑡
− ≤ 𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥       ∀𝑡    (ID5) 
 
SUPPLIER
PRODUCER
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Capacity constraints: 
  𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘 ≤ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑡
𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗 =1   ∀𝑡                    (ID6) 
 𝑐𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛼𝑡𝐶 + ∆𝐶𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1    ∀𝑡     (ID7) 
∆𝐶𝑡 ≤ ∆𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡     (ID8) 
 
Network constraints: 
 𝑥𝑗𝑡 = 1
𝑇
𝑡=1       ∀𝑗    (ID9) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗  𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑙 + ∆𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑙, ∀𝑙   (ID10) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷ℎ 𝑥ℎ𝑡 ≤  𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1      ∀𝑗, ℎ ∈ 𝑃 𝑗    (ID11) 
 
Material balance constraints: 
 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐽
𝑗 =1      ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (ID12) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡 −  𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1     ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (ID13) 
𝐼𝑖1 = 0      ∀𝑖  (ID14) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡      ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (ID15) 
𝐼𝑖1
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑖
′       ∀𝑖     (ID16) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑧𝑖𝑡       ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (ID17) 
 
Integrality and non-negativity constraints: 
𝑌𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡
+, 𝑌𝑡
−, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡 , ∆𝑗 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆 , 𝑄𝑖𝑡 , ∆𝐶𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑗  (ID18) 
𝑥𝑗𝑡 ∈  0,1 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1}     ∀𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑡  (ID19) 
 
Indices and index sets: 
t ∈  1, … , T Period 
i ∈  1, … , I  Component  
j ∈  1, … , J  Job 
l ∈  1, … , L  Order 
Jl  index set of jobs customer order l  
Pj  set of immediate predecessor jobs of job j 
 
Variables: 
𝑌𝑡    Capacity manpower in period t 
𝑌𝑡
+  Increase in capacity in period t 
𝑌𝑡
−  Decrease in capacity in period t 
𝑥𝑗𝑡    Assembly indicator (𝑥𝑗𝑡 =1 if job j is started at time t) 
  Coordination Mechanisms in Supply Chain 
   
26 
 
𝑦𝑡    Overtime in period t 
𝐼𝑖𝑡   Inventory of component i in period t (producer) 
∆𝑗   Number of periods job j surpasses its due date 
𝑑𝑖𝑡   Order quantity of component i in period t 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆   Inventory of component i in period t(supplier) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured in period t) 
∆𝐶𝑡  Increase in capacity in period t 
𝑄𝑖𝑡   Production amount of product i in period t 
 
 
Constants: 
c  Cost per capacity unit 
𝑐+  Cost to increase the capacity by one unit 
𝑐−  Cost to decrease the capacity by one unit 
𝑝𝑖   Purchase price of component i 
𝑐  Overtime cost 
ℎ𝑖
𝑃  Holding cost of component i for the producer 
F  Penalty cost for exceeding the due date 
𝑌1
′   Initial capacity 
𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity 
𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal decrease in capacity 
𝑎𝑗𝑘   Capacity consumption of job j in period k after its start 
𝐷𝑗   Duration of the job 
𝐸𝑙   Due date of customer order l 
𝑣𝑖𝑗   Quantity of component i required to start job j 
ℎ𝑖
𝑆  Holding cost of component i for the supplier 
𝑠𝑖   Setup cost of component i 
τ  Cost to increase the capacity by one unit 
𝐼1
′   Initial inventory 
𝑐𝑖   Manufacturing coefficient of component i 
C  Normal capacity 
𝛼𝑡   % capacity available in period t 
∆𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity 
M  Number representing infinite 
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In the ideal model, the delivered amount is no longer anticipated for the producer but 
explicitly optimized. Also the equation (P13) becomes obsolete, as the anticipation 
function for the delivery is not necessary. 
The objective function of the unified model describes the minimization of the total costs 
for both parties including: capacity costs for the producer, overtime costs for the 
producer, holding costs for the producer, costs for delayed deliveries for the producer, 
holding costs for the supplier, manufacturing costs for the supplier and capacity costs 
for the supplier. 
The constraints are shared in the producer and supplier previous models, so they have 
been already explained in the individual models. 
In the ideal model, decisions are taken altogether with producer and supplier, so the 
benefit is considering the complete supply chain. This also means that each party 
individually will have a better economic benefit, as now it is known the information that 
was missing or estimated in the individual models, and then the chain will provide a 
better solution for each system.      
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6- Extended models 
Concerning the supply chain structures, we have only taken into account one supplier 
and one producer. In the next study an extension of these models will be made, 
analyzing any possibility structure in the supply chain: multiple suppliers and one 
producer, multiple producers and one supplier and finally and arbitrary structure with 
multiple producers and multiple suppliers (Figure 4). In this section, only the ideal 
model will be extended and studied, considering that is the model that covers all 
important aspects of the other anticipations in one model.    
 
Group Parameter Comment 
Structure 1 – 1 Producer – Supplier 
 1 – S 1 producer – Multiple suppliers 
 P – 1 Multiple producers – 1 supplier 
 P – S Multiple producers – multiple suppliers 
Figure 4. Table with different structures of the supply chain 
 
6.1- Ideal model with one producer and multiple suppliers 
(IMS) 
 
In the next section it is introduced multiple suppliers to the ideal model. This model tries 
to investigate the effect of smaller suppliers, each one with smaller capacities and 
features, compared to a bigger supplier like in the previous model, that is, what 
happens if the producer distributes her demand through multiple smaller suppliers 
rather than a bigger one. This case could be a good solution to the companies that 
have to work with large quantities and one supplier does not have enough capacity for 
delivering the total production.  
 
 
Figure 5. Scheme of a supply chain with multiple suppliers 
PRODUCER
SUPPLIER 1 SUPPLIER 2 SUPPLIER 3
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Objective function: 
 𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑍𝐼𝑀𝑆 =
  𝑐𝑌𝑡 + 𝑐
+𝑌𝑡
+ + 𝑐−𝑌𝑡
− 𝑇𝑡=1 +  𝑐 𝑦𝑡 +   ℎ𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑃 +   𝐹 max𝑗∈𝐽𝑙 ∆𝑗 +
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
    ℎ𝑖
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑘  
𝑆
𝑠=1 +   𝜏∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1      (IMS1) 
 
Constraints: 
Capacity adaptation constraints: 
𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡
+ − 𝑌𝑡
−     ∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1  (IMS2) 
𝑌1 = 𝑌1
′           (IMS3) 
𝑌𝑡
+ ≤ 𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡    (IMS4) 
𝑌𝑡
− ≤ 𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥       ∀𝑡    (IMS5) 
 
Capacity constraints: 
  𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘 ≤ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑡
𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗 =1   ∀𝑡                    (IMS6) 
  𝑐𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 ≤  𝛼𝑡𝑠𝐶𝑠 + ∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝐼
𝑖=1   ∀𝑡     (IMS7) 
∆𝐶𝑡𝑠 ≤ ∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑚𝑎 𝑥      ∀𝑡, 𝑠     (IMS8) 
 
Network constraints: 
 𝑥𝑗𝑡 = 1
𝑇
𝑡=1       ∀𝑗    (IMS9) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗  𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑙 + ∆𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑙, ∀𝑙   (IMS10) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷ℎ 𝑥ℎ𝑡 ≤  𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1      ∀𝑗, ℎ ∈ 𝑃 𝑗    (IMS11) 
 
Material balance constraints: 
 𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡 ≤  𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝐽
𝑗 =1     ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (IMS12) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑃 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑃 +  𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 −  𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1   ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (IMS13)  
𝐼𝑖1
𝑃 = 0      ∀𝑖  (IMS14) 
 𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑠
𝑆𝑆
𝑠=1 =  𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑠 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1    ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (IMS15) 
 𝐼𝑖1𝑠
𝑆𝑆
𝑠=1 = 𝐼𝑖
′      ∀𝑖     (IMS16) 
 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 ≤  𝑀𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1     ∀𝑖, 𝑡     (IMS17) 
 
Order and delivery constraints: 
 𝑑𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝑝 =  𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝑝
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑝  (IMSP18) 
 
Integrality and non-negativity constraints: 
𝑌𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡
+, 𝑌𝑡
−, 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑃 , ∆𝑗 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆 , 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑠 , ∆𝐶𝑡𝑠 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑗, 𝑠  (IMS18) 
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𝑥𝑗𝑡 ∈  0,1 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑠 ∈ {0,1}    ∀𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑡, s  (IMS19) 
 
New or modified indices and index sets: 
s ∈  1. . S  Suppliers 
 
New or modified variables: 
𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠   Order quantity of component i in period t delivered by supplier s 
𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑠   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured in period t by 
supplier s) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑠   Production amount of product i in period t by supplier s 
𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆   Inventory of component i in period t of supplier s 
∆𝐶𝑡𝑠   Increase in capacity in period t for supplier s 
 
New or modified constants: 
𝐶𝑠  Normal capacity for the supplier s 
𝛼𝑡𝑠   % capacity available in period t for the supplier s 
∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity for the supplier s 
 
There have been some changes in the model, as the new index set related to the set of 
suppliers. Related to the variables, all the ones concerning information about the 
suppliers now include the index s, to know the information for each supplier. Also the 
orders and the deliveries have changed, to know which quantity will produce each 
supplier for the producer. The constants related to the capacity of the suppliers have 
also changed to have every capacity included. In this model, a new constraint has been 
created, to adjust the order demand of the producer with the delivery amount of the 
supplier. 
 
6.2- Ideal model with one supplier and multiple producers 
(IMP) 
 
In the next model, we are working on a supply chain with one supplier and several 
producers. This model tries to investigate the effect of smaller producers, each one 
with smaller orders and jobs, compared to a bigger producer as it can be seen in the 
ideal model, that is, what happens if on supplier distributes the orders through multiple 
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smaller producers rather than a bigger one. This could be the case when the same 
supplier has to distribute the products through a group of factories from the company 
that are located at various geographic points. 
 
Figure 6. Scheme of a supply chain with one supplier and multiple producers 
 
Objective function: 
 𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑍𝐼𝑀𝑃 =
   𝑐𝑌𝑡𝑝 + 𝑐
+𝑌𝑡𝑝
+ + 𝑐−𝑌𝑡𝑝
− 𝑃𝑝=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 +   𝑐 𝑦𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 +     ℎ𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃𝑃
𝑝=1  +
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 𝐹 max𝑗∈𝐽𝑙  ∆𝑗𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1  +      ℎ𝑖
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆 +  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1  +  𝜏∆𝐶𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐿
𝑙=1   (IMP1) 
 
Constraints: 
Capacity adaptation constraints: 
𝑌𝑡+1,𝑝 = 𝑌𝑡𝑝 + 𝑌𝑡𝑝
+ − 𝑌𝑡𝑝
−    ∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1, 𝑝  (IMP2) 
𝑌1𝑝 = 𝑌1
′      ∀𝑝    (IMP3) 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
+ ≤ 𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡, 𝑝    (IMP4) 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
− ≤ 𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥       ∀𝑡, 𝑝    (IMP5) 
 
Capacity constraints: 
   𝑎𝑗 ,𝑝 ,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 ≤  𝑌𝑡𝑝 + 𝑦𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1
𝑡
𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗 =1  ∀𝑡                   (IMP6) 
  𝑐𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 ≤ 𝛼𝑡𝐶 + ∆𝐶𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1    ∀𝑡     (IMP7) 
∆𝐶𝑡 ≤ ∆𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡     (IMP8) 
 
Network constraints: 
 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝 = 1
𝑇
𝑡=1       ∀𝑗, 𝑝    (IMP9) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗𝑝  𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝 ≤ 𝐸𝑙𝑝 + ∆𝑗𝑝
𝑇
𝑡=1    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑙, ∀𝑙, 𝑝   (IMP10) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷ℎ𝑝 𝑥ℎ𝑡𝑝 ≤  𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑗, ℎ ∈ 𝑃 𝑗    (IMP11) 
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Material balance constraints: 
  𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑝 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 ≤  (𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃)
𝐽
𝑗 =1   ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (IMP12) 
 𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 =  (𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝 −  𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑝 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝
𝐽
𝑗 =1
𝑃
𝑝=1 )          ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (IMP13) 
𝐼𝑖1𝑝 = 0      ∀𝑖, 𝑝  (IMP14) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝     ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑝     (IMP15) 
𝐼𝑖1
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑖
′       ∀𝑖     (IMP16) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝 ≤ 𝑀𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝       ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑝     (IMP17) 
 
Integrality and non-negativity constraints: 
𝑌𝑡𝑝 , 𝑌𝑡𝑝
+ , 𝑌𝑡𝑝
− , 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝 , 𝑦𝑡𝑝 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝 , ∆𝑗𝑝 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆 , 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝 , ∆𝐶𝑡 ≥ 0      ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑗, 𝑝  (IMP18) 
𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝 ∈  0,1 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝 ∈ {0,1}   ∀𝑗, 𝑡, 𝑝  (IMP19) 
 
New or modified indices and index sets: 
p ∈  1. . P  Producers 
 
New or modified variables: 
𝑌𝑡𝑝    Capacity manpower in period t for the producer p 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
+  Increase in capacity in period t for the producer p 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
−  Decrease in capacity in period t for the producer p 
𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝    Assembly indicator (𝑥𝑗𝑡 =1 if job j is started at time t in producer p) 
𝑦𝑡𝑝    Overtime in period t for the producer p 
𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃  Inventory of component i in period t for producer p 
∆𝑗𝑝   Number of periods job j surpasses its due date in producer p 
𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝   Order quantity of component i in period t of the producer p 
𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured in period t for 
producer p) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝   Production amount of product i in period t for the producer p 
 
New or modified constants 
𝑌𝑝
+𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity for the producer p 
𝑌𝑝
−𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal decrease in capacity for the producer p 
𝑎𝑗𝑘𝑝   Capacity consumption of job j in period k after its start for the producer p 
  Coordination Mechanisms in Supply Chain 
   
33 
 
𝐷𝑗𝑝   Duration of the job for the producer p 
𝐸𝑙𝑝   Due date of customer order l for the producer p 
𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑝   Quantity of component i required to start job j for the producer p 
 
As a new index set there can be found the group of producers. Related to the modified 
variables there are changes that affect all the variables that came from the producer’s 
model. There are different capacities, overtimes and inventories for each producer. 
Also there are some changes in the order quantities form the producers (𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝 ), which 
now takes into account the origin of each order according to the producer. About the 
production amount of the components that has to be manufactured (𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝 ), now it is 
introduced also the destination of each production. 
For the modified constants, now there are multiple capacities for the different 
producers, as well as related to the jobs taken in each factory: duration, capacity 
consumption and due dates for the orders in every producer.   
 
 
6.3- Ideal model with multiple suppliers and multiple 
producers (IMSP) 
 
Next model is the global ideal model that can fit with all type of supply chains, as it 
introduces multiple suppliers and multiple producers. This model can indicate the best 
distribution of the order quantities and deliveries, with an arbitrary structure of the 
chain. Essentially, this model tries to represent the behavior of smaller suppliers 
together with smaller producers, each one having smaller capacities, productivity and 
features, and tries to compare them with a bigger supplier and a bigger producer like in 
the ideal model. 
 
Figure 7. Scheme of a supply chain with an arbitrary distribution of suppliers and producers 
SUPPLIER 2
PRODUCER 1 PRODUCER 2 PRODUCER 3 PRODUCER 4
SUPPLIER 3
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Objective function: 
 𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑍𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑃 =
   𝑐𝑌𝑡𝑝 + 𝑐
+𝑌𝑡𝑝
+ + 𝑐−𝑌𝑡𝑝
− 𝑃𝑝=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 +   𝑐 𝑦𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 +     ℎ𝑖
𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃𝑃
𝑝=1  +
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 𝐹 max𝑗∈𝐽𝑙  ∆𝑗𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1  +      (ℎ𝑖
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆 +  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑃
𝑝=1
𝑆
𝑠=1 ) +    𝜏∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝐿
𝑙=1   
          (IMSP1) 
Constraints: 
Capacity adaptation constraints: 
𝑌𝑡+1,𝑝 = 𝑌𝑡𝑝 + 𝑌𝑡𝑝
+ − 𝑌𝑡𝑝
−    ∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1, 𝑝  (IMSP2) 
𝑌1𝑝 = 𝑌1
′      ∀𝑝    (IMSP3) 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
+ ≤ 𝑌+𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡, 𝑝    (IMSP4) 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
− ≤ 𝑌−𝑚𝑎𝑥       ∀𝑡, 𝑝    (IMSP5) 
 
Capacity constraints: 
   𝑎𝑗 ,𝑝 ,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 ≤  𝑌𝑡𝑝 + 𝑦𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1
𝑡
𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗 =1  ∀𝑡                   (IMSP6) 
   𝑐𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑃
𝑝=1 ≤  𝛼𝑡𝑠𝐶𝑠 + ∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝐼
𝑖=1   ∀𝑡    (IMSP7) 
∆𝐶𝑡𝑠 ≤ ∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥      ∀𝑡, 𝑠     (IMSP8) 
 
Network constraints: 
 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝 = 1
𝑇
𝑡=1       ∀𝑗, 𝑝    (IMSP9) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗𝑝  𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝 ≤ 𝐸𝑙𝑝 + ∆𝑗𝑝
𝑇
𝑡=1    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑙, ∀𝑙, 𝑝   (IMSP10) 
  𝑡 + 𝐷ℎ𝑝 𝑥ℎ𝑡𝑝 ≤  𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1     ∀𝑗, ℎ ∈ 𝑃 𝑗    (IMSP11) 
 
Material balance constraints: 
  𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑝 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 ≤   (𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑘
𝑃
𝑝=1 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃)𝐾𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗 =1                     ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (IMSP12) 
 𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑝
𝑃𝑃
𝑝=1 =  𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃 +  𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1 −  𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑝 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑃
𝑝=1         ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (IMSP13) 
𝐼𝑖1𝑝
𝑃 = 0      ∀𝑖, 𝑝  (IMSP14) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑠
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠     ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑠    (IMSP15) 
𝐼𝑖1𝑠
𝑆 = 𝐼𝑖
′      ∀𝑖, 𝑠     (IMSP16) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠 ≤ 𝑀𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠      ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑠    (IMSP17) 
 
Integrality and non-negativity constraints: 
𝑌𝑡𝑝 , 𝑌𝑡𝑝
+ , 𝑌𝑡𝑝
− , 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠 , 𝑦𝑡𝑝 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃 , ∆𝑗𝑝 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆 , 𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠 , ∆𝐶𝑡𝑠 ≥ 0      ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑗, 𝑝, 𝑠  (IMSP19) 
𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝 ∈  0,1 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠 ∈ {0,1}   ∀𝑗, 𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑠  (IMSP20) 
  Coordination Mechanisms in Supply Chain 
   
35 
 
New or modified indices and index sets: 
p ∈  1. . P  Producers 
s ∈  1. . S  Suppliers 
 
New or modified variables: 
𝑌𝑡𝑝    Capacity manpower in period t for the producer p 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
+  Increase in capacity in period t for the producer p 
𝑌𝑡𝑝
−  Decrease in capacity in period t for the producer p 
𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑝    Assembly indicator (𝑥𝑗𝑡 =1 if job j is started at time t in producer p) 
𝑦𝑡𝑝    Overtime in period t for the producer p 
𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑃  Inventory of component i in period t for producer p 
∆𝑗𝑝   Number of periods job j surpasses its due date in producer p 
𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠   Order quantity of component i in period t ordered by the producer p to 
the supplier s. 
𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠   Setup indicator (𝑧𝑖𝑡=1 if component i is manufactured by the supplier s in 
period t for producer p) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑠   Production amount of product i by supplier s in period t for the producer 
p 
𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑆   Inventory of component i in period t of supplier s 
∆𝐶𝑡𝑠   Increase in capacity in period t for supplier s 
 
New or modified constants 
𝑌𝑝
+𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity for the producer p 
𝑌𝑝
−𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal decrease in capacity for the producer p 
𝑎𝑗𝑘𝑝   Capacity consumption of job j in period k after its start for the producer p 
𝐷𝑗𝑝   Duration of the job for the producer p 
𝐸𝑙𝑝   Due date of customer order l for the producer p 
𝑣𝑖𝑗 𝑝   Quantity of component i required to start job j for the producer p 
𝐶𝑠  Normal capacity for the supplier s 
𝛼𝑡𝑠   % capacity available in period t for the supplier s 
∆𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥   Maximal increase in capacity for the supplier s 
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The global model (IMSP) integrates both producers and suppliers, as a mix of the 
previous models (IMS and IMP). Thus, the producer will know which is the best 
supplier to order the lot and the supply will deliver it on the best schedule possible. 
Related to the changes on the model, there are the same indices, variables and 
constants as the previous models, except for the orders and the production amount of 
each component i, that now specify which producer is demanding the order and which 
supplier is producing the lot. 
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7- Numerical analysis  
 
In this section, a numerical analysis will be undertaken to test and validate the initial 
models and the new extended models. The software used to solve all the models will 
be AMPL. AMPL is an acronym for "A Mathematical Programming Language", is 
an algebraic modeling language for describing and solving high-complexity problems 
for large-scale mathematical computation (i.e. large-scale optimization and scheduling-
type problems). One particular advantage of AMPL is the similarity of its syntax to the 
mathematical notation of optimization problems. This allows for a very concise and 
readable definition of problems in the domain of optimization.5 
 
7.1- Specification of the analysis 
In order to analyze the models, we will specify all the data from each model.  
 
The producer’s model is a capacity model with a work load given by a sequence of 12 
orders comprising altogether 28 jobs. The planning horizon is 10 periods. The structure 
of the orders and the jobs will be as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Structure of the orders 
Figure 8 shows us that there are three types of orders. The first type (green) consists of 
4 orders containing 2 jobs each order, the second type (orange) consists of 4 orders 
                                                          
5
 Robert Fourer, 2003. 
Order 1 Job 1 Job 2
Order 2 Job 3
Job 4
Job 5
Order 3 Job 6 Job 7
Order 4 Job 8 Job 9
Order 12 Job 27 Job 28
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but in this case each order has three jobs, two of them working in parallel. And the last 
type of orders (purple) consists also of 4 orders with 2 jobs each order. That makes a 
total of 12 orders and 28 jobs. 
In the next section, there will be the data specified for the producer for each type, but is 
important to consider that it has to be repeated for the total number of orders. 
 
Order type 1 2 3 
Number of orders 4 4 4 
Job 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Predecessor - 1 - 3 3 - 6 
Number of component 1 10 20 0 20 0 10 10 
Number of component 2 0 10 20 20 20 10 0 
Duration 3 2 1 4 2 2 1 
Due date 6 6 9 9 9 7 7 
Table 1. Data of orders 
 
ajt 
Job j 
      1 2 21 22 23 81 82 
1 40 10 20 20 20 10 20 
2 40 10 
 
20 20 10 
 
3 40 
  
20 
   
4 
   
20 
   
Table 2. Capacity consumption of job j in period t after its start 
 
Constants Value 
c 0,5 ($/h) 
c+ 1($/h) 
c- 0,2($/h) 
Y'1 40 (h) 
Y+max 30(h) 
Y-max 30(h) 
𝑐 2($/h) 
F 60($/h) 
hp1, h
p
2 2($/unit),2($/unit) 
p1,p2 10($/unit),10($/unit) 
K 1,5($/unit) 
e 0,5($/unit) 
Table 3. Data of producer's model 
The supplier’s data will be specified as follows. 
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Constants Value 
p1,p2 10($/unit),10($/unit) 
hs1, h
s
2 1($/unit),1($/unit) 
s1,s2 1($), 1($) 
τ 1,5($/h) 
I'1, I'2 0 (units), 0 (units) 
c1,c2 2(h/unit), 2(h/unit) 
C 300(h) 
ΔCmaxt 80(h) 
Table 4. Data of supplier model 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
alpha 0,62 0,20 0,44 0,14 0,30 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,50 0,50 
Table 5. Expectation of the distribution variable alpha in period t 
 
The most important fact in all the data is that a high value for penalty cost F for 
exceeding the due date has been chosen to make sure that delayed deliveries are 
really an issue and hence, coordination mechanisms are indeed effective. 
For the new producers and suppliers created in the extended models the data is 
specified as follows. 
There will be a total of 4 producers and/or 3 suppliers in the supply chain. In order to 
make a good comparison between models, the data chosen is the one dividing the 
original number by 4 or 3, depending if it is a parameter from the producer or from the 
supplier. In that way, the total amount of orders will be divided and distributed for each 
producer, so each one will have a total of 3 orders and 7 jobs (see figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of the orders of the producers 
Producer 1
Order 1
Order 2
Order 3
Producer 2
Order 4
Order 5
Order 6
Producer 3
Order 7
Order 8
Order 9
Producer 4
Order 10
Order 11
Order 12
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The duration, predecessors, due dates, etc., and the parameters related with the 
orders will have the same value as mentioned before for the individual parties. 
The values that change in these new models for the new producers will be the next: 
      
Y'1 10 (h) 
Y+max hours 
Producer  1 7,5(h) 
Producer  2 7,5(h) 
Producer  3 7,5(h) 
Producer  4 7,5(h) 
Y-max hours 
Producer  1 7,5(h) 
Producer  2 7,5(h) 
Producer  3 7,5(h) 
Producer  4 7,5(h) 
  
    
C 
 Supplier 1 100 
Supplier 2 100 
Supplier 3 100 
ΔCmaxt 
 Supplier 1 26 
Supplier 2 26 
Supplier 3 26 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6. Data changed for new producers and 
suppliers
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supplier 1- alpha 0,62 0,20 0,44 0,14 0,30 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,50 0,50 
Supplier 2- alpha 0,62 0,20 0,44 0,14 0,30 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,50 0,50 
Supplier 3- alpha 0,62 0,20 0,44 0,14 0,30 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,50 0,50 
Table 7. ALpha values for the suppliers 
 
In order to complete the non reactive anticipation and the reactive anticipation models, 
the following data will be used for their estimated values related to the supplier: 
 
- Non reactive anticipation: 
Constants Value 
τ 1,5($/h) 
c1,c2 2(h/unit), 2(h/unit) 
C 300(h) 
AL 120(h) 
Table 8. Data for the new constraints in non reactive anticipation 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Expected alpha 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Table 9. Alpha expected for the non reactive anticipation model 
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- Reactive anticipation:  
In order to react to the supplier’s delivery, this model recreates a supplier model with 
their expected data, which will be: 
 
Constants Value 
p1,p2 10($/unit),10($/unit) 
hs1, h
s
2 1($/unit),1($/unit) 
s1,s2 1($), 1($) 
τ 1,5($/h) 
I'1, I'2 0 (units), 0 (units) 
c1,c2 2(h/unit), 2(h/unit) 
C 300(h) 
ΔCmaxt 100(h) 
Table 10. Expected supplier data for the reactive anticipation model 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Expected alpha 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Table 11. Expected alpha for the reactive anticipation model 
 
To get the q, which is the parameter that gets the reaction to the supplier, it will be 
introduced the demand of the non reactive model to the estimated supplier model. 
Then, the supplier model will obtain his order delivery, which will be introduced to the 
reactive anticipation model in the equation:  
𝛿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑡  
This method is planned to get a good anticipative reaction to the supplier with a better 
performance. 
 
7.2- Results 
 
In this section, an extensive analytical investigation will be made, reproducing all the 
previous models in a spreadsheet and modifying some of the most important 
characteristics of the supplier one by one to get a sequential value with the program 
AMPL. The models will be compared in two ways; the first one will analyze the effect of 
different anticipation of the producers while the second one will analyze the ideal 
models with different number of producers and suppliers.     
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7.2.1- Total costs 
 
The main result consists on analyze the total cost performance of the supply link with 
the different types of anticipative coordination and with the extended ideal models.  
The total costs are obtained in optimizing the appropriate supply link for the specified 
data and in varying the alpha value to get the worst case and the best case, with some 
arbitrary values within the range of alpha. Then, taking the equation ID1 as a reference, 
all the values will be replaced for those obtained to get an impartial and adequate 
comparison between methods. 
For different values of alpha, we decided to use arbitrary values within the range, which 
will be the following: 
 
Alpha 
range 
Period 
0,1-0,2 0,2-0,3 0,3-0,4 0,4-0,5 0,5-0,6 0,6-0,7 0,7-0,8 0,8-0,9 1 
1 0,11 0,21 0,31 0,41 0,51 0,61 0,71 0,81 1,00 
2 0,18 0,28 0,38 0,48 0,58 0,68 0,78 0,88 1,00 
3 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80 1,00 
4 0,13 0,23 0,33 0,43 0,53 0,63 0,73 0,83 1,00 
5 0,17 0,27 0,37 0,47 0,57 0,67 0,77 0,87 1,00 
6 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80 0,90 1,00 
7 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80 0,90 1,00 
8 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80 0,90 1,00 
9 0,15 0,25 0,35 0,45 0,55 0,65 0,75 0,85 1,00 
10 0,15 0,25 0,35 0,45 0,55 0,65 0,75 0,85 1,00 
Table 12. Arbitrary values assigned 
 
The next figure gives the corresponding result of the variation of the parameter alpha 
and the effect that can cause to the models in each type of anticipation. This effect is 
due to the fact that the supplier is distributing the same components to other producers 
that are not taken into account by the producer; hence the capacity available is 
restricted. Looking at figure 10, the reactive anticipation is the closest to the ideal 
model, which is hardly applicable on the real world. Depending on how good the 
producer anticipated the supplier model, the total cost of the reactive model would 
slightly change up or down. In this case, the total cost can be improved, as the data 
used for the estimated supplier slightly defers on the real data. Then it can be assumed 
that for the closest data it can be obtained compared to the real supplier, the better 
solution you can get, and most similar to the ideal model solution. There is also clear  
the advantage of this model in front of the non reactive anticipation and the pure top- 
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Figure 10. Total cost for different anticipations 
down hierarchy. The pure top-down hierarchy model doesn’t take into account any 
characteristics of the supplier or any possible reactions, so it is the worst model 
obtained as the total cost of the supply chain is really high. Non reactive anticipation 
model tries to take into account some important features of the supplier so it can get a 
better result than the pure top-down, but as it cannot react to the supplier deliveries the 
result cannot be as good as the reactive one. The most important of figure 10 is that it 
is showed the advantage of combining control-oriented and task-oriented coupling 
mechanisms.  
For the extended models, in figure 11 there is a comparison with the ideal models 
depending if they have one or multiple parties.  
 
 
Figure 11. Total cost for ideal models with multiple producers/suppliers 
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As it can be observed in the results, the difference between incrementing only the 
suppliers, or incrementing only the producers is nearly unappreciated , as the models 
have the same reaction and performance than in the ideal model. In the case of 
multiple suppliers or multiple producers altogether, it can be seen that total cost is 
higher than the other models, even though the result improves with the extreme values 
of alpha. 
It would be important to remark in this case, the values obtained in the model with an 
increment of the producers but with only one supplier. From alphas ranged higher than 
60%, this model is slightly better than the ideal model, as you can see in the table 13.  
 
Alpha range 0,1-0,2 0,2-0,3 0,3-0,4 0,4-0,5 0,5-0,6 0,6-0,7 0,7-0,8 0,8-0,9 1 
Ideal 2960 2359 1964 1742 1608 1537 1494 1465 1427 
S suppliers 2977 2375 1979 1758 1618 1545 1503 1471 1432 
P producers 3030 2403 2048 1775 1621 1500 1464 1439 1407 
Global 3396 3172 2962 2754 2569 2408 2246 2084 1881 
Table 13. Numerical results in extended models with different range of alphas 
 
7.2.2- Private knowledge about capacity expansion cost 
 
Figure 12 gives the result for the pure top-down hierarchy, the non reactive 
anticipation, the reactive anticipation and the ideal model. The comparison of these 
models is performed in optimizing and evaluating total costs, using the variables 
optimized in equation ID1.  
 
 
Figure 12. Private knowledge about capacity expansion cost 
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In this figure (Fig. 12), the expansion capacity cost is changing to higher or lower 
values, and the results compare the value get with the models to the deviation from the 
total cost of the ideal model in the initial value of τ=1,5.  
As it is shown in Figure 12, results are improving in every model as the parameter 
value is lower. Hence, the deviation of anticipated model is better than the other two 
models but it is slightly worse than the ideal model.  
For the extended models in the figure 13, it is found that incrementing de τ for the ideal 
model with multiple suppliers or multiple producers it is not a factor that affects the 
result, as the two models follows exactly the same deviation as the ideal model with 
individual parties. In the other hand, the model with various producers and suppliers 
altogether, has a deviated result from the others. Despite the bad results of the global 
model, it is getting some improvements with bigger τ, then it gets only a deviation 
from the other ideal models around 20%, in contrast of the deviation around 40% that it 
gets when τ are smaller.  
 
 
Figure 13. Private knowledge about capacity expansion cost for suppliers/producers 
 
In table 14 it can be seen the numerical results for the extended models when there is 
a variation of the capacity cost τ. It is of importance to remark that some values from 
the model with multiple producers are again getting some better performance when the 
capacity expansion cost is reduced around a 40% or 50%. Then, there is an 
improvement of the total cost compared with the ideal model with only one producer.     
 
-20,00%
-10,00%
0,00%
10,00%
20,00%
30,00%
40,00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
D
e
vi
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 t
o
ta
l c
o
st
 o
f 
id
e
al
 m
o
d
e
l 
Variation of capacity expansion cost τ
Private knowledge about capacity 
expansion cost τ
Ideal
S suppliers
P producers
S suppliers & P 
producers
  Coordination Mechanisms in Supply Chain 
   
46 
 
Cost τ -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
Ideal 
% 
1974 2036 2078 2120 2160 2199 2235 2270 2306 2342 2378 
-10,23 -7,41 -5,50 -3,59 -1,77 0,00 1,64 3,23 4,87 6,50 8,14 
S suppliers 
% 
1996 2051 2097 2139 2179 2217 2253 2288 2324 2360 2396 
-9,2 -6,7 -4,6 -2,7 -0,9 0,8 2,5 4,0 5,7 7,3 9,0 
P producers 
% 
1955 2032 2106 2147 2186 2225 2265 2304 2343 2382 2421 
-11,10 -7,59 -4,23 -2,36 -0,59 1,18 3,00 4,77 6,55 8,32 10,10 
Global 
% 
2871 2889 2907 2924 2939 2934 2952 2938 2954 2937 2941 
30,56 31,38 32,20 32,97 33,65 33,42 34,24 33,61 34,33 33,56 33,74 
Table 14. Numerical results in extended models for different costs τ 
 
7.2.3- Private knowledge about the supplier’s capacity situation 
 
The next results are considering the case that the normal supplier’s capacity is not 
known by the producers. The more the supplier is committed to other producers, the 
less sure the producer can be to estimate its correct capacity. In figure 14, capacity will 
be varied taken into account that non reactive anticipation model and anticipated model 
have estimated a C=300(h). Again, the ideal model represents the best results and the 
pure top-down hierarchy the worst case.  Between the two anticipation models is 
important to remark the benefit of having a reactive anticipation against having a non 
reactive one, because the improvement of the model is notorious. Additionally, the 
effect of having overestimations or underestimations of the capacity affects the total 
costs of these functions. For example, an overestimation of the capacity does not affect 
the performance of the anticipation while an underestimation results in higher costs.  
 
 
Figure 14. Variation of normal capacity for different anticipations 
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In the case of figure 15, it can be seen that the differences between the models with 
multiple parties and one individual, with the ideal model, are slightly different 
independently of the variation of the capacity. Again, we can see that the model with 
multiple parties in producers and suppliers is worse than the other models, but that he 
reacts different depending on the variation of the capacity. For example, for capacities 
reduced to a half, the global model only defers from the others around a 10%. But for 
capacities incremented to a half, then the total cost increments around a 40%.  
 
 
Figure 15. Variation of normal capacity for suppliers/producers 
 
Finally, looking at the results in detail in table 16, it can be observed again that in two 
cases there is an improvement of the ideal model with multiple producers compared to 
the ideal with individual parties. Here, for capacities incremented around 20% or 30% 
multiple producers can have a better performance than the ideal model. 
 
Capacity -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
Ideal 
% 
2951 2717 2568 2433 2301 2199 2098 2012 1963 1902 1825 
34,20 23,56 16,78 10,64 4,64 0,00 -4,59 -8,50 -10,73 -13,51 -17,01 
S suppliers 
% 
2982 2755 2589 2456 2321 2217 2115 2030 1979 1919 1841 
35,61 25,28 17,74 11,69 5,55 0,82 -3,82 -7,69 -10,00 -12,73 -16,28 
P producers 
% 
2993 2753 2614 2490 2352 2225 2107 2009 1945 1907 1828 
36,11 25,19 18,87 13,23 6,96 1,18 -4,18 -8,64 -11,55 -13,28 -16,87 
Global 
% 
3308 3263 3145 3058 2980 2905 2856 2822 2743 2698 2597 
50,43 48,39 43,02 39,06 35,52 32,11 29,88 28,33 24,74 22,69 18,10 
Table 15. Numerical results in extended models for different capacities 
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8- Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis analyzed coordination mechanisms in supply chain. Using the theory of 
hierarchical planning it is presented different kinds of reactions for the producers, and 
finally it is obtained an ideal model that links the producer with the supplier, embracing 
the whole network. Then, an extension of the ideal model has been made to include 
more producers or more suppliers in the supply chain.  
In total, it has been showed four types of anticipation: the pure top-down hierarchy, the 
non –reactive anticipation, the reactive anticipation and the ideal model, which is hardly 
applicable. For the pure top-down hierarchy, none of the features of the supplier are 
taken into account, which implies that only a task-oriented instruction is exerted. For 
the non-reactive anticipation, important characteristics of the supplier were considered, 
particularly his capacity situation and the ability to adapt his capacity. This type of 
anticipation, however, is still on a low level of integration, since it does not account for 
any reaction to the producer’s action. Hence, as in the pure top-down case, one has 
only a task-oriented type of instruction showing a performance which, essentially, is not 
much better than the pure top-down hierarchy case. Only the reactive anticipation 
which fully takes into account the supplier’s model results in a substantially improved 
outcome deviating only slightly from the ideal situation. Formally, this satisfactory 
performance is due to the combined effect of a task-oriented and a control-oriented 
coupling mechanism. 
Clearly, the reactive anticipation is not that easy to calculate as compared with the pure 
top-down and the non-reactive anticipation coordination schemes. In addition, far more 
information needs to be known. On the other hand, the results do not differ too much 
from the ideal situation for which even more data is necessary and even more complex 
analysis must be performed. Hence for a situation in which the parties are willing 
closely to cooperate, the reactive anticipation can be considered as a reasonable 
scheme. 
Three types of extended models have also been considered: the model with multiple 
suppliers which distribute to one producer, the model with multiple producers that order 
to the same supplier and the case when various producers order to a various suppliers. 
Taking the same amount of orders for all the producers and the same capacity for all 
the suppliers, we can conclude that the model with one producer and one supplier 
gives the best results in most of the cases, even though one producer – multiple 
suppliers and multiple producers – one supplier doesn’t defer too much from the ideal 
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results. In addition, multiple producers sometimes can give a better result than only one 
individual, depending on the capacity of the supplier and its parameters. On the other 
hand, working with smaller producers together with smaller suppliers it is not the best 
solution for the global supply chain performance as it can be seen in the results.        
 
This thesis is focused on the operational performance of a supply chain using 
coordination mechanisms. So it would be important for a new contract between 
producer/s and supplier/s, to use these operational results for the negotiations. 
Comparing information costs with the advantages of a closer coordination would be a 
key issue not only favorable for the producer but for the supplier as well. In particular, 
in agreeing on a reactive anticipative coordination scheme one would choose optimal 
values for total costs and delayed deliveries.  
Finally, it would be of major interest to study the introduction of multiple smaller 
producers, rather than a larger one, but considering the capacity and the features of 
the supplier to get the best optimized result in the total cost of the supply chain.   
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9-  Appendices 
 
The next section shows the extended models recreated with AMPL program, including 
the model and the data used. As they have been tested for different situations, the 
models that are next described may have some arbitrary data, depending on the 
situation last used. 
 
A. Ideal model with one producer and multiple suppliers 
(IMS) 
A.1.  Model 
 
# MODEL PARAMETERS 
param T >=0 integer; 
param I >=0 integer; 
param J >=0 integer; 
param L >=0 integer; 
param S >=0 integer; 
 
#INDEX SETS 
set PERIOD := 1..T; 
set COMP := 1..I; 
set JOB := 1..J; 
set ORDER := 1..L; 
set JOBl {ORDER}; 
set PRED {JOB}; 
set PERIOD2 := 1..T+1; 
set SUPP := 1..S; 
 
#DECISION VARIABLES  
var Y {t in PERIOD}>=0 ; 
var Yp {t in PERIOD}>=0 ; 
var Ym {t in PERIOD}>=0 ; 
var x {(j,t) in {JOB, PERIOD}}binary; 
var y {t in PERIOD}>=0 ; 
var Inv {(i,t) in {COMP, PERIOD}}>=0 ; 
var In {l in ORDER, j in JOBl[l]}>=0 ; 
var d {(i,t,k) in {COMP, PERIOD, SUPP}}>= 0 ; 
var hi {l in ORDER}>=0 ; 
var Invs {(i,t,k) in {COMP, PERIOD2, SUPP}}>= 0 ; 
var z {(i,t,k) in {COMP, PERIOD,SUPP}}binary; 
var INC {t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}>= 0 ; 
var Q {(i,t,k) in {COMP, PERIOD,SUPP}}>= 0 ; 
#CONSTANTS 
param c>=0; 
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param cp>=0; 
param cm>=0; 
param p{i in COMP} >=0; 
param co >=0; 
param hp {i in COMP} >=0; 
param pc>=0; 
param Yo>=0; 
param Ypmax>=0; 
param Ymmax>=0; 
param a{(j,k) in {JOB, PERIOD}}>=0; 
param D{j in JOB}>=0; 
param E{l in ORDER}>=0; 
param v{(i,j) in {COMP, JOB}}>=0; 
param hs {i in COMP} >=0; 
param s {i in COMP} >=0; 
param kc >=0; 
param MAX>=0; 
param Io {i in COMP}>=0; 
param cmc {i in COMP} >=0; 
param C {k in SUPP} >=0; 
param alfa {t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}>=0; 
param INCmax {t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}>=0; 
 
#OBJECTIVE 
minimize objective: sum {t in PERIOD} (c*Y[t] + cp*Yp[t]+ cm*Ym[t]) + sum {t in 
PERIOD} co*y[t] + sum {t in PERIOD, i in COMP} hp[i] * Inv[i,t] + sum {l in 
ORDER} pc * hi[l]+ sum{t in PERIOD, i in COMP, k in 
SUPP}(hs[i]*Invs[i,t,k]+s[i]*z[i,t,k])+sum{t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}kc * INC[t,k]; 
 
#CONSTRAINTS 
#CAPACITY ADAPTATION CONSTRAINTS 
subject to Capacity {t in 1..T-1}: 
Y[t+1]==Y[t]+Yp[t]-Ym[t]; 
subject to Capacity2: 
Y[1]==Yo; 
subject to Capacity3 {t in PERIOD}: 
Yp[t]<=Ypmax; 
subject to Capacity4 {t in PERIOD}: 
Ym[t]<=Ymmax; 
 
#CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS 
subject to Capacity5 {t in PERIOD}: 
sum{j in JOB, k in 1..t} a[j, t+1-k]*x[j,k]<=Y[t]+y[t]; 
subject to Capacity6 {t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}: 
sum {i in COMP} cmc[i] * Q[i,t,k] <= alfa[t,k] * C[k] + INC[t,k]; 
subject to Max_Capacity {t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}: 
INC[t,k] <= INCmax[t,k]; 
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#NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
subject to network1 {j in JOB}: 
sum{t in PERIOD} x[j,t]=1; 
subject to network2 {l in ORDER, j in JOBl[l]}: 
sum{t in PERIOD}(t+D[j])*x[j,t]<=E[l]+In[l,j]; 
subject to network3 {j in JOB, h in PRED[j]}: 
sum{t in PERIOD}(t+D[h])*x[h,t]<=sum{t in PERIOD}t*x[j,t]; 
 
#MATERIAL BALANCE CONSTRAINTS 
subject to material1 {i in COMP, t in PERIOD}: 
sum{j in JOB}v[i,j]*x[j,t]<=sum{k in SUPP} d[i,t,k]+Inv[i,t]; 
subject to material2 {i in COMP, t in 1..T-1}: 
Inv[i,t+1]==Inv[i,t]+sum{k in SUPP}d[i,t,k]- sum{j in JOB}v[i,j]*x[j,t]; 
subject to material3 {i in COMP}: 
Inv[i,1]== 0; 
subject to Inventory {i in COMP, t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}: 
Invs[i,t+1,k] == Invs[i,t,k] + Q[i,t,k] - d[i,t,k]; 
subject to In_INventory {i in COMP, k in SUPP}: 
Invs[i,1,k]== 0; 
subject to Production {i in COMP, t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}: 
Q[i,t,k] <= z[i,t,k]*MAX; 
 
#OTHERS 
subject to DefineHi {l in ORDER, j in JOBl[l]}: 
hi[l]>=In[l,j]; 
subject to Product {i in COMP, k in SUPP}: 
sum{t in PERIOD} d[i,t,k]==sum{t in PERIOD}Q[i,t,k]; 
 
A.2.  Data of the model 
 
param T := 10; 
param I := 2; 
param J := 28; 
param L := 12; 
param S := 3; 
param c :=0.5; 
param cp := 1; 
param cm := 0.2; 
param p:= 
1 10 
2 10; 
param co := 2; 
param hp := 
1 2 
2 2; 
param pc:= 60; 
param Yo := 40; 
param Ypmax:= 30; 
param Ymmax:= 30; 
param kc := 1.5; 
param MAX := 1000000000000; 
 
param v: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
 22 23 24 25 26 27 28:= 
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1 10 20 0 20 0 10 10 10 20 0 20
 0 10 10 10 20 0 20 0 10 10 10
 20 0 20 0 10 10  
2 0 10 20 20 20 10 0 0 10 20 20
 20 10 0 0 10 20 20 20 10 0 0
 10 20 20 20 10 0;  
 
param D:= 
 
1 3 
2 2 
3 1 
4 4 
5 2 
6 2 
7 1 
8 3 
9 2 
10 1 
11 4 
12 2 
13 2 
14 1 
15 3 
16 2 
17 1 
18 4 
19 2 
20 2 
21 1 
22 3 
23 2 
24 1 
25 4 
26 2 
27 2 
28 1 
; 
 
param E:= 
 
1 6 
2 9 
3 7 
4 6 
5 9 
6 7 
7 6 
8 9 
9 7 
10 6 
11 9 
12 7; 
 
param a: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10:= 
1 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 20 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 20 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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15 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 20 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 20 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0; 
 
set PRED[1] := ; 
set PRED[2] := 1; 
set PRED[3] := ; 
set PRED[4] := 3; 
set PRED[5] := 3; 
set PRED[6] := ; 
set PRED[7] := 6; 
set PRED[8] :=; 
set PRED[9] :=8; 
set PRED[10] :=; 
set PRED[11] :=10; 
set PRED[12] :=10; 
set PRED[13] :=; 
set PRED[14] :=13; 
set PRED[15] :=; 
set PRED[16] :=15; 
set PRED[17] :=; 
set PRED[18] :=17; 
set PRED[19] :=17; 
set PRED[20] :=; 
set PRED[21] :=20; 
set PRED[22] :=; 
set PRED[23] :=22; 
set PRED[24] :=; 
set PRED[25] :=24; 
set PRED[26] :=24; 
set PRED[27] :=; 
set PRED[28] :=27; 
 
set JOBl[1]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3]:= 6 7; 
set JOBl[4]:= 8 9; 
set JOBl[5]:= 10 11 12; 
set JOBl[6]:= 13 14; 
set JOBl[7]:= 15 16; 
set JOBl[8]:= 17 18 19; 
set JOBl[9]:= 20 21; 
set JOBl[10]:= 22 23; 
set JOBl[11]:= 24 25 26; 
set JOBl[12]:= 27 28; 
 
param hs := 
1 1 
2 1; 
param s := 
1 1 
2 1; 
param Io := 
1 0 
2 0; 
param cmc := 
1 2 
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2 2; 
param C :=  
1 100 
2 100 
3 100; 
 
param INCmax: 1 2 3:= 
1 26 27 27 
2 26 27 27 
3 26 27 27 
4 26 27 27 
5 26 27 27 
6 26 27 27 
7 26 27 27 
8 26 27 27 
9 26 27 27 
10 26 27 27; 
 
param alfa : 1 2 3:= 
1 0.71 0.71 0.71 
2 0.78 0.78 0.78 
3 0.70 0.70 0.70 
4 0.73 0.73 0.73 
5 0.77 0.77 0.77 
6 0.80 0.80 0.80 
7 0.80 0.80 0.80 
8 0.80 0.80 0.80 
9 0.75 0.75 0.75 
10 0.75 0.75 0.75; 
 
B. Ideal model with multiple producers and one supplier 
(IMP) 
B.1.  Model 
 
#MODEL PARAMETERS 
param T >=0 integer; 
param I >=0 integer; 
param J >=0 integer; 
param L >=0 integer; 
param M >=0 integer; 
 
#CONJUNTOS DE INDICES 
set PERIOD := 1..T; 
set COMP := 1..I; 
set JOB := 1..J; 
set ORDER := 1..L; 
set PROD := 1..M; 
set JOBl {ORDER, PROD}; 
set PRED {JOB, PROD}; 
set PERIOD2 := 1..T+1; 
 
 
#DECISION VARIABLES  
var Y {t in PERIOD,m in PROD}>=0; 
var Yp {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}>=0; 
var Ym {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}>=0; 
var x {(j,t,m) in {JOB, PERIOD, m in PROD}}binary; 
var y {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}>=0; 
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var Inv {(i,t,m) in {COMP, PERIOD, PROD}}>=0; 
var In {l in ORDER, m in PROD, j in JOBl[l,m]}>=0; 
var d {(i,t,m) in {COMP, PERIOD, PROD}}>= 0; 
var hi {m in PROD,l in ORDER}>=0; 
var Invs {(i,t) in {COMP, PERIOD2}}>= 0; 
var z {(i,t,m) in {COMP, PERIOD, PROD}}binary; 
var INC {t in PERIOD}>= 0; 
var Q {(i,t,m) in {COMP, PERIOD,PROD}}>= 0; 
 
#CONSTANTS 
param c>=0; 
param cp>=0; 
param cm>=0; 
param p{i in COMP} >=0; 
param co >=0; 
param hp {i in COMP} >=0; 
param pc>=0; 
param Yo>=0; 
param Ypmax{m in PROD}>=0; 
param Ymmax{m in PROD}>=0; 
param a{(j,m, k) in {JOB, PROD, PERIOD}}>=0; 
param D{j in JOB, m in PROD}>=0; 
param E{l in ORDER, m in PROD}>=0; 
param v{(i,m,j) in {COMP, PROD, JOB}}>=0; 
param hs {i in COMP} >=0; 
param s {i in COMP} >=0; 
param kc >=0; 
param MAX>=0; 
param Io {i in COMP}>=0; 
param cmc {i in COMP} >=0; 
param C >=0; 
param alfa {t in PERIOD}>=0; 
param INCmax {t in PERIOD}>=0; 
 
#OBJECTIVE 
minimize objective: sum {t in PERIOD, m in PROD} (c*Y[t,m] + cp*Yp[t,m]+ 
cm*Ym[t,m]) + sum {t in PERIOD, m in PROD} co*y[t,m] + sum {t in PERIOD, i 
in COMP, m in PROD} hp[i] * Inv[i,t,m] + sum {l in ORDER, m in PROD} pc * 
hi[m,l]+ sum{t in PERIOD, i in COMP}(hs[i]*Invs[i,t]+s[i]*sum {m in PROD} 
z[i,t,m])+sum{t in PERIOD}kc * INC[t]; 
 
#CONSTRAINTS 
#CAPACITY ADAPTATION CONSTRAINTS 
subject to Capacity {t in 1..T-1, m in PROD}: 
Y[t+1,m]==Y[t,m]+Yp[t,m]-Ym[t,m]; 
subject to Capacity2 {m in PROD}: 
Y[1,m]==Yo; 
subject to Capacity3 {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
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Yp[t,m]<=Ypmax[m]; 
subject to Capacity4 {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
Ym[t,m]<=Ymmax[m]; 
 
#CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS 
subject to Capacity5 {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
sum{j in JOB, k in 1..t} a[j, m, t+1-k]*x[j,k,m]<=(Y[t,m]+y[t,m]); 
subject to Capacity6 {t in PERIOD}: 
sum {i in COMP, m in PROD} cmc[i] * Q[i,t,m] <= alfa[t]*C + INC[t]; 
subject to Max_Capacity {t in PERIOD}: 
INC[t] <= INCmax[t]; 
 
#NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
subject to network1 {j in JOB, m in PROD}: 
sum{t in PERIOD} x[j,t,m]=1; 
subject to network2 {l in ORDER,  m in PROD, j in JOBl[l,m]}: 
sum{t in PERIOD}((t+D[j,m])*x[j,t,m])<=E[l,m]+In[l,m,j]; 
subject to network3 {j in JOB,  m in PROD, h in PRED[j,m]}: 
sum{t in PERIOD}(t+D[h,m])*x[h,t,m]<=sum{t in PERIOD}t*x[j,t,m]; 
 
#MATERIAL BALANCE CONSTRAINTS 
 
subject to material1 {i in COMP, t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
sum{j in JOB}(v[i,m,j]*x[j,t,m])<=(d[i,t,m]+Inv[i,t,m]); 
subject to material2 {i in COMP, t in 1..T-1, m in PROD}: 
Inv[i,t+1,m]==(Inv[i,t,m]+d[i,t,m]- sum{j in JOB}v[i,m,j]*x[j,t,m]); 
subject to material3 {i in COMP, m in PROD}: 
Inv[i,1,m]== 0; 
subject to Inventory {i in COMP, t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
Invs[i,t+1] == Invs[i,t] + Q[i,t,m] - d[i,t,m]; 
subject to In_INventory {i in COMP}: 
Invs[i,1]== 0; 
subject to Production {i in COMP, t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
Q[i,t,m] <=  z[i,t,m]*MAX; 
 
#OTHERS 
subject to DefineHi {l in ORDER, m in PROD, j in JOBl[l,m]}: 
hi[m,l]>=In[l,m,j]; 
subject to Product {i in COMP, m in PROD}: 
sum{t in PERIOD} d[i,t,m]==sum{t in PERIOD}Q[i,t,m]; 
 
 
 
B.2.  Data of the model 
 
param T := 10; 
param I := 2; 
param J := 7; 
param L := 3; 
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param M := 4; 
param c :=0.5; 
param cp := 1; 
param cm := 0.2; 
param p:= 
1 10 
2 10; 
param co := 2; 
param hp := 
1 2 
2 2; 
param pc:= 60; 
param Yo := 10; 
param Ypmax:=  
1 7.5 
2 7.5 
3 7.5 
4 7.5; 
param Ymmax:=  
1 7.5 
2 7.5 
3 7.5 
4 7.5; 
param kc := 1.5; 
param MAX := 1000000000000; 
 
param v: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7:= 
1 1 10 20 0 20 0 10 10  
2 1 0 10 20 20 20 10 0  
1 2 10 20 0 20 0 10 10 
2 2 0 10 20 20 20 10 0  
1 4 10 20 0 20 0 10 10 
2 4 0 10 20 20 20 10 0  
1 3 10 20 0 20 0 10 10  
2 3 0 10 20 20 20 10 0; 
 
param D: 1 2 3 4:= 
 
1 3 3 3 3 
2 2 2 2 2 
3 1 1 1 1 
4 4 4 4 4 
5 2 2 2 2 
6 2 2 2 2 
7 1 1 1 1; 
 
 
param E:1 2 3 4:= 
1 6 6 6 6 
2 9 9 9 9 
3 7 7 7 7; 
 
param a: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10:= 
1 1 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 20  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 20  20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1 2 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 2 20  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 2 20  20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 2 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 2 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 2 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 3 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 3 20  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 3 20  20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 3 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 3 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 3 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 4 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 4 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 4 20  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 4 20  20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 4 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 4 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 4 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0; 
 
set PRED[1,1] := ; 
set PRED[2,1] := 1; 
set PRED[3,1] := ; 
set PRED[4,1] := 3; 
set PRED[5,1] := 3; 
set PRED[6,1] := ; 
set PRED[7,1] := 6; 
set PRED[1,2] := ; 
set PRED[2,2] := 1; 
set PRED[3,2] := ; 
set PRED[4,2] := 3; 
set PRED[5,2] := 3; 
set PRED[6,2] := ; 
set PRED[7,2] := 6; 
set PRED[1,3] := ; 
set PRED[2,3] := 1; 
set PRED[3,3] := ; 
set PRED[4,3] := 3; 
set PRED[5,3] := 3; 
set PRED[6,3] := ; 
set PRED[7,3] := 6; 
set PRED[1,4] := ; 
set PRED[2,4] := 1; 
set PRED[3,4] := ; 
set PRED[4,4] := 3; 
set PRED[5,4] := 3; 
set PRED[6,4] := ; 
set PRED[7,4] := 6;
 
set JOBl[1,1]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2,1]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3,1]:= 6 7; 
set JOBl[1,2]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2,2]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3,2]:= 6 7 ; 
set JOBl[1,3]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2,3]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3,3]:= 6 7 ; 
set JOBl[1,4]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2,4]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3,4]:= 6 7 ; 
 
param hs := 
1 1 
2 1; 
param s := 
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1 1 
2 1; 
param Io := 
1 0 
2 0; 
param cmc := 
1 2 
2 2; 
param C := 300; 
 
param INCmax := 
1 80 
2 80 
3 80 
4 80 
5 80 
6 80 
7 80 
8 80 
9 80 
10 80; 
 
param alfa := 
1 0.62 
2 0.20 
3 0.44 
4 0.14 
5 0.30 
6 0.22 
7 0.22 
8 0.22 
9 0.50 
10 0.50; 
 
C. Ideal model with multiple suppliers and multiple 
producers (IMSP) 
C.1.  Model 
 
#MODEL PARAMETERS 
param T >=0 integer; 
param I >=0 integer; 
param J >=0 integer; 
param L >=0 integer; 
param M >=0 integer; 
param S >=0 integer; 
 
#INDEX SETS 
set PERIOD := 1..T; 
set COMP := 1..I; 
set JOB := 1..J; 
set ORDER := 1..L; 
set PROD := 1..M; 
set JOBl {ORDER, PROD}; 
set PRED {JOB, PROD}; 
set PERIOD2 := 1..T+1; 
set SUPP := 1..S; 
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#DECISION VARIABLES  
var Y {t in PERIOD,m in PROD}>=0; 
var Yp {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}>=0; 
var Ym {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}>=0; 
var x {(j,t,m) in {JOB, PERIOD, m in PROD}}binary; 
var y {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}>=0; 
var Inv {(i,t,m) in {COMP, PERIOD, PROD}}>=0; 
var In {l in ORDER, m in PROD, j in JOBl[l,m]}>=0; 
var d {(i,t,m,k) in {COMP, PERIOD, PROD,SUPP}}>= 0; 
var hi {m in PROD,l in ORDER}>=0; 
var Invs {(i,t,k) in {COMP, PERIOD2,SUPP}}>= 0; 
var z {(i,t,m,k) in {COMP, PERIOD, PROD,SUPP}}binary; 
var INC {t in PERIOD,k in SUPP}>= 0; 
var Q {(i,t,m,k) in {COMP, PERIOD,PROD, SUPP}}>= 0; 
 
#CONSTANTS 
param c>=0; 
param cp>=0; 
param cm>=0; 
param p{i in COMP} >=0; 
param co >=0; 
param hp {i in COMP} >=0; 
param pc>=0; 
param Yo>=0; 
param Ypmax{m in PROD}>=0; 
param Ymmax{m in PROD}>=0; 
param a{(j,m, k) in {JOB, PROD, PERIOD}}>=0; 
param D{j in JOB, m in PROD}>=0; 
param E{l in ORDER, m in PROD}>=0; 
param v{(i,m,j) in {COMP, PROD, JOB}}>=0; 
param hs {i in COMP} >=0; 
param s {i in COMP} >=0; 
param kc >=0; 
param MAX>=0; 
param Io {i in COMP}>=0; 
param cmc {i in COMP} >=0; 
param C {k in SUPP} >=0; 
param alfa {t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}>=0; 
param INCmax {t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}>=0; 
 
#OBJECTIVE 
minimize objective: sum {t in PERIOD, m in PROD} (c*Y[t,m] + cp*Yp[t,m]+ 
cm*Ym[t,m]) + sum {t in PERIOD, m in PROD} co*y[t,m] + sum {t in PERIOD, i 
in COMP, m in PROD} hp[i] * Inv[i,t,m] + sum {l in ORDER, m in PROD} pc * 
hi[m,l]+ sum{t in PERIOD, i in COMP, k in SUPP}(hs[i]*Invs[i,t,k]+s[i]*sum {m in 
PROD} z[i,t,m,k])+sum{t in PERIOD,k in SUPP}kc * INC[t,k]; 
 
#CONSTRAINTS 
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#CAPACITY ADAPTATION CONSTRAINTS 
subject to Capacity {t in 1..T-1, m in PROD}: 
Y[t+1,m]==Y[t,m]+Yp[t,m]-Ym[t,m]; 
subject to Capacity2 {m in PROD}: 
Y[1,m]==Yo; 
subject to Capacity3 {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
Yp[t,m]<=Ypmax[m]; 
subject to Capacity4 {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
Ym[t,m]<=Ymmax[m]; 
 
#CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS 
subject to Capacity5 {t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
sum{j in JOB, k in 1..t} a[j, m, t+1-k]*x[j,k,m]<=(Y[t,m]+y[t,m]); 
subject to Capacity6 {t in PERIOD,k in SUPP}: 
sum {i in COMP} cmc[i] * sum{m in PROD} Q[i,t,m,k] <=alfa[t,k]*C[k] + INC[t,k]; 
subject to Max_Capacity {t in PERIOD, k in SUPP}: 
INC[t,k] <= INCmax[t,k]; 
 
#NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
subject to network1 {j in JOB, m in PROD}: 
sum{t in PERIOD} x[j,t,m]=1; 
subject to network2 {l in ORDER,  m in PROD, j in JOBl[l,m]}: 
sum{t in PERIOD}((t+D[j,m])*x[j,t,m])<=E[l,m]+In[l,m,j]; 
subject to network3 {j in JOB,  m in PROD, h in PRED[j,m]}: 
sum{t in PERIOD}(t+D[h,m])*x[h,t,m]<=sum{t in PERIOD}t*x[j,t,m]; 
 
#MATERIAL BALANCE CONSTRAINTS 
subject to material1 {i in COMP, t in PERIOD, m in PROD}: 
sum{j in JOB}(v[i,m,j]*x[j,t,m])<=sum{k in SUPP}(d[i,t,m,k]+Inv[i,t,m]); 
subject to material2 {i in COMP, t in 1..T-1, m in PROD}: 
Inv[i,t+1,m]==sum{k in SUPP}(Inv[i,t,m]+d[i,t,m,k]- sum{j in JOB}v[i,m,j]*x[j,t,m]); 
subject to material3 {i in COMP, m in PROD}: 
Inv[i,1,m]== 0; 
subject to Inventory {i in COMP, t in PERIOD, k in SUPP, m in PROD}: 
Invs[i,t+1,k] == Invs[i,t,k] +Q[i,t,m,k] - d[i,t,m,k]; 
subject to In_INventory {i in COMP, k in SUPP}: 
Invs[i,1,k]== 0; 
subject to Production {i in COMP, t in PERIOD, m in PROD, k in SUPP}: 
Q[i,t,m,k] <=  z[i,t,m,k]*MAX; 
 
#OTHERS 
subject to DefineHi {l in ORDER, m in PROD, j in JOBl[l,m]}: 
hi[m,l]>=In[l,m,j]; 
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C.2.  Data of the model 
 
param T := 10; 
param I := 2; 
param J := 7; 
param L := 3; 
param M := 4; 
param S := 3; 
param c :=0.5; 
param cp := 1; 
param cm := 0.2; 
param p:= 
1 10 
2 10; 
param co := 2; 
param hp := 
1 2 
2 2; 
param pc:= 60; 
param Yo := 10; 
param Ypmax:=  
1 7.5 
2 7.5 
3 7.5 
4 7.5; 
param Ymmax:=  
1 7.5 
2 7.5 
3 7.5 
4 7.5; 
param kc :=1.5; 
param MAX := 1000000000000; 
 
param v: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7:= 
1 1 10 20 0 20 0 10 10  
2 1 0 10 20 20 20 10 0  
1 2 10 20 0 20 0 10 10 
2 2 0 10 20 20 20 10 0  
1 4 10 20 0 20 0 10 10 
2 4 0 10 20 20 20 10 0  
1 3 10 20 0 20 0 10 10  
2 3 0 10 20 20 20 10 0; 
 
param D: 1 2 3 4:= 
 
1 3 3 3 3 
2 2 2 2 2 
3 1 1 1 1 
4 4 4 4 4 
5 2 2 2 2 
6 2 2 2 2 
7 1 1 1 1; 
 
param E:1 2 3 4:= 
 
1 6 6 6 6 
2 9 9 9 9 
3 7 7 7 7; 
 
param a: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10:= 
1 1 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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3 1 20  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 20  20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 2 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 2 20  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 2 20  20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 2 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 2 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 2 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 3 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 3 20  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 3 20  20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 3 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 3 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 3 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 4 40 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 4 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 4 20  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 4 20  20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 4 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 4 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 4 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0; 
 
set PRED[1,1] := ; 
set PRED[2,1] := 1; 
set PRED[3,1] := ; 
set PRED[4,1] := 3; 
set PRED[5,1] := 3; 
set PRED[6,1] := ; 
set PRED[7,1] := 6; 
set PRED[1,2] := ; 
set PRED[2,2] := 1; 
set PRED[3,2] := ; 
set PRED[4,2] := 3; 
set PRED[5,2] := 3; 
set PRED[6,2] := ; 
set PRED[7,2] := 6; 
set PRED[1,3] := ; 
set PRED[2,3] := 1; 
set PRED[3,3] := ; 
set PRED[4,3] := 3; 
set PRED[5,3] := 3; 
set PRED[6,3] := ; 
set PRED[7,3] := 6; 
set PRED[1,4] := ; 
set PRED[2,4] := 1; 
set PRED[3,4] := ; 
set PRED[4,4] := 3; 
set PRED[5,4] := 3; 
set PRED[6,4] := ; 
set PRED[7,4] := 6; 
 
set JOBl[1,1]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2,1]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3,1]:= 6 7; 
set JOBl[1,2]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2,2]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3,2]:= 6 7 ; 
set JOBl[1,3]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2,3]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3,3]:= 6 7 ; 
set JOBl[1,4]:= 1 2; 
set JOBl[2,4]:= 3 4 5; 
set JOBl[3,4]:= 6 7 ; 
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param hs := 
1 1 
2 1; 
param s := 
1 1 
2 1; 
param Io := 
1 0 
2 0; 
param cmc := 
1 2 
2 2; 
param C :=  
1 150 
2 150 
3 150; 
 
param INCmax: 1 2 3:= 
1 26.6 26.6 26.6 
2 26.6 26.6 26.6 
3 26.6 26.6 26.6 
4 26.6 26.6 26.6 
5 26.6 26.6 26.6 
6 26.6 26.6 26.6 
7 26.6 26.6 26.6 
8 26.6 26.6 26.6 
9 26.6 26.6 26.6 
10 26.6 26.6 26.6; 
 
param alfa : 1 2 3:= 
1 0.62 0.62 0.62 
2 0.20 0.2 0.2 
3 0.44 0.44 0.44 
4 0.14 0.14 0.14 
5 0.30 0.3 0.3 
6 0.22 0.22 0.22 
7 0.22 0.22 0.22 
8 0.22 0.22 0.22 
9 0.50 0.5 0.5 
10 0.50 0.5 0.5; 
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